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By means of the examples of classical and Bohmian quantum mechanics,
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1 Introduction
Any fundamental physical theory is a theory of the universe as a whole: its laws describe
the evolution of the entire configuration of matter. Thus, in classical mechanics (CM),
where the forces range all over physical space, the motion of any particle at any given
time depends, strictly speaking, on the position and the momentum of all the other
particles and thus on the initial state of the entire universe. In quantum mechanics
(QM), due to entanglement, the only fundamental quantum state is the one pertaining
to the universe as a whole and represented by the universal wave function. However,
this fundamental point of view is utterly impractical for everyday science, which seeks
to apply these theories to quite small parts of the universe. Aside from our limited
computational resources, we simply do not know the exact configuration of matter and
/ or the exact wave function of the universe so that we could solve the equations of
motion for them.
Thus, in order to derive testable propositions from a physical theory, we need a pro-
cedure to get from fundamental laws, describing the global evolution of the universe,
to predictions about particular subsystems. Such a procedure was proposed by Ludwig
Boltzmann whose derivation of thermodynamic laws from microscopic particle dynamics
can be viewed as a general scheme for probabilistic reasoning in the face of incomplete
information.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate Boltzmann’s ideas as a general way of understand-
ing probabilities in deterministic theories. We argue that the same reasoning applies to
both classical and quantum mechanics, in particular if the latter is understood in terms
of Bohmian mechanics. In fact, as Einstein already noted, Boltzmann’s insights are
independent of the details of the underlying microscopic theory (c.f. Einstein’s auto-
biographical notes in Schilpp (1970)). Against this background, we then inquire what,
if any, is the difference between probabilities in CM and in QM and why the quantum
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world appears to us so much more random and unpredictable.
Concerning quantum mechanics, we endorse the theory going back to de Broglie (1928)
and Bohm (1952) whose dominant contemporary version is known as Bohmian Mechan-
ics (BM) (Dürr et al. (2013)). The primary reason for doing so is that QM runs into the
infamous measurement problem illustrated by Schrödinger’s cat paradox (see Maudlin
(1995a) for a precise formulation). Quantum theories that solve the measurement prob-
lem by being committed to a definite configuration of matter in physical space are known
as primitive ontology theories. The wave function then has the job to describe how this
configuration evolves in time. Bohmian mechanics is the most prominent example of a
primitive ontology formulation of QM. The primitive ontology here are particles charac-
terized by their positions. The configuration of particles in physical space then evolves
according to a non-local law of motion in which the wave function enters. We adopt
Bohmian mechanics, because we take it to provide the most convincing solution to the
measurement problem (but we do not have the space to argue for this claim here; see
e.g. Maudlin (1995b) and Esfeld (2014)).
Moreover, by positing the same primitive ontology as CM – point particles moving
in three-dimensional physical space – BM is best suited for highlighting the similarities
between quantum and classical mechanics as far as the status and interpretation of
probabilities is concerned. In this vein, we seek to counter the widespread belief that
probabilities in the quantum realm are fundamentally different from those encountered
in classical statistical mechanics. (In standard QM, the source of randomness is the
collapse of the wave function replacing the deterministic Schrödinger evolution. But
since the collapse postulate is obscure, the status of this randomness remains obscure as
well.)
Nonetheless, there are certain striking differences between CM and QM that we have
to account for. For instance, also in Bohmian QM, one cannot do better than to make
statistical predictions according to Born’s rule. In CM, by contrast, there are many
situations in which one can obtain a reliable deterministic description of a particular
subsystem. What is the reason for this difference? We seek to answer these questions in
the concluding Section 4 of the paper.
2 Probabilities in classical mechanics
In classical mechanics, the physical state of an N -particle system is completely deter-
mined by specifying the positions and momenta of all the particles. Denoting by qi
and pi the position, respectively the momentum of the i’th particle, we call X(t) =
3
(q1(t), ..., qN (t); p1(t), ..., pN (t)) the microstate of the system at time t. The space of all
possible microstates, here Γ := R3N ×R3N , is called phase space. The microstate evolves
according to the microscopic laws of motion, which, in the Hamiltonian formulation,
take the form 

q˙i =
∂H
∂pi
p˙i = −
∂H
∂qi
, (1)
with
H(q, p) =
N∑
i=1
p2i
2mi
+ V (q1, . . . , qn). (2)
More compactly, this can be written as
(q˙i, p˙i) = v
H(q, p), (3)
where vH denotes the vector field on Γ generated by the Hamiltonian H. These equations
give rise to a Hamiltonian flow Φt,0 such that X(t) = Φt,0(X) for any initial microstate
X. In equation (2), mi denotes the mass of the i’th particle and V the interaction
potential, which can be split into
V (q1, . . . , qn) =
∑
i<j
Vint(qi − qj) + Vext(q1, ..., qN , t). (4)
Vint then corresponds to a pair-interaction among the particles (e.g. gravitation) and
Vext is an external potential, summarizing the influences of the environment. Of course,
if the N particle system is the entire universe, then Vext = 0, since there is nothing
outside the universe.
If Vext is zero (or at least time-independent), such a Hamiltonian system has several
nice properties. For one, it conserves the total energy, meaning that H = const. along
any solution of (1). Furthermore, by the Liouville theorem, the Hamiltonian flow con-
serves phase space volume. This is to say that the uniform Lebesgue measure λ is a
stationary measure on Γ in the sense that for all t ≥ 0 and any Borel set A ⊆ Γ,
λ(Φt,0A) = λ(A). (5)
For fixed E ∈ R, it is usually convenient to consider the reduced phase space ΓE :=
{X ∈ Γ : H(X) = E} to which a system with total energy E is confined by virtue of
energy conservation. λ then induces a stationary measure λE on the hypersurface ΓE,
which is called the microcanonical measure. By convention, we normalize this measure
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to λE(ΓE) = 1.
2.1 Randomness and typicality
Given that CM is deterministic, where does randomness come from? There are at least
three reasons to depart from the deterministic description: (i) we do not have access to
the exact values of all positions and momenta in a given physical system. We can neither
manipulate them with arbitrary precision in experimental situations, nor measure the
exact (initial) microstate X in order to determine the system’s trajectory. (ii) Physical
systems can be extremely sensitive to perturbations of their initial conditions. This
means that even a small error about the initial data can translate into a huge error
about the evolution of the system. (iii) The complexity of calculation increases rapidly
as N becomes very large.
Against this background, it seems reasonable and necessary to make two concessions.
First, it usually suffices to provide a coarse-grained description of the system. That
is, rather than asking for the exact microstate, we are interested in the value of certain
macroscopic “observables” F : Γ→ R. These observables are coarse-graining in the sense
that a great number of microstates X will in general correspond to (approximately) the
same value of F .1 Second, since we cannot determine the exact evolution of the system
– if only for the fact that we do not know the exact initial conditions –, we can only ask
what happens in most possible instances, that is, for typical initial conditions.
In some cases, typical trajectories coarse grain to one and the same macroscopic his-
tory, so that predictions appear deterministic (e.g. when we set out to determine the
trajectory of a stone thrown on earth). In many cases, though, typical initial conditions
agree only on certain statistical patterns in the distribution of coarse-grained observ-
ables (e.g. when we ask for the relative frequency of heads or tails in a long series of
coin tosses). In these cases, probabilities come into play.
In any case, if we can establish that a certain fact or feature occurs for the vast
majority of possible initial conditions – that is, in the last resort, for the overwhelming
majority of possible universes described by a particular theory –, we can justifiably call it
a prediction of that theory (see Lazarovici and Reichert (2015) for a detailed discussion).
In order to make such an argument precise, we need a measure on phase space telling
us what an “overwhelming majority” of initial conditions is. Such a measure is called
typicality measure. Given a typicality measure µ, we can say that a particular property
1Mathematically, if Γ is endowed with a probability measure, such a function is called a random variable,
though the name is somewhat deceiving: there is really nothing random about it, since the macrostate
of a system (defined in terms of such observables) is determined by its microstate.
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P is typical, if
µ
({
X ∈ Γ : P (X)
})
≈ 1, (6)
and atypical if
µ
({
X ∈ Γ : P (X)
})
≈ 0. (7)
Note that most properties will be neither typical nor atypical. Such features of our
universe then simply cannot be explained by an appeal to typicality and require some
other e.g. causal explanation.
In CM, the natural typicality measure is the Lebesgue measure, respectively the in-
duced microcanonical measure on the energy shell. However, one needs to answer the
question how this particular choice is justified. What determines a good typicality mea-
sure? We take stationarity to be the crucial desideratum, since it is essential to a sensible
notation of typicality that it does not change with time. Stationarity of the measure,
i.e. equation (5), assures that typical sets remain typical and atypical sets remain atyp-
ical under the time evolution. In Hamiltonian mechanics, the Lebesgue measure is thus
distinguished as the simplest stationary measure on classical phase space.
In the literature, the choice of the Lebesgue measure – i.e. the equidistribution – as
typicality measure is often motivated by an appeal to the principle of indifference (see
e.g. Bricmont (1995)). We do not endorse this point of view. For us, stationarity is
the key requirement. When we come to Bohmian QM, we will see that it is indeed the
stationary measure, not the equidistribution, that yields the correct notion of typicality.
Historically, the microcanonical measure has also been justified by an appeal to the
ergodic hypothesis (see e.g. Sklar (1973) for a discussion). Ergodicity, in the modern
mathematical sense, does indeed distinguish a unique stationary measure (up to sets
of measure 0). However, there is much doubt as to whether the systems usually stud-
ied in statistical mechanics are actually ergodic. Also, contrary to widespread believe,
ergodicity per se has no bearing on Boltzmann’s statistical arguments.
The appeal to stationarity is usually good enough to ensure that the typicality measure
is not introduced ad hoc but suggested by the fundamental physical theory. Stationarity
alone will in general not distinguish the measure uniquely. (For instance, any function of
the HamiltonianH defines a stationary measure on classical phase space). However, since
typicality is not per se part of the physical laws but a way of reasoning about these laws,
the appeal to somewhat subjective criteria such as simplicity is quite appropriate. Still,
the situation is more satisfying in Bohmian Mechanics, where the pertinent typicality
measure can be shown to be unique in a rather strong sense.
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2.2 Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics: the ideal gas
To demonstrate how a typicality argument works, let’s consider the stock example of
an ideal gas in a box (with perfectly reflecting walls) that will serve as our toy-model
for the universe. The number of particles in such a macroscopic system is of the order
of Avogadro’s constant, that is N ∼ 1023. Clearly, determining the actual configuration
and / or predicting the trajectories for so many particles is a hopeless task, even if the
particles are non-interacting as in our example.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make meaningful predictions about this system. For
instance, we can ask the following: what is the rate of particles that have a velocity in
x-direction that is approximately v0, where v0 is some arbitrary, positive number? We
can formalize this in terms of the random variable:
F (X) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
χ{vi,x∈[v0−δ,v0+δ]}(X). (8)
Here, δ > 0 is a small positive number (giving precise meaning to “approximately v0”)
and χ is the indicator function, i.e. χ{vi,x∈[v0−δ,v0+δ]} equals one if vi,x =
1
mpi,x lies in
the interval [v0 − δ, v0 + δ] and zero if it does not.
Fixing the mean energy per particle to EN =
3
2kBT (kB is the Boltzmann constant and
T can later be identified as the temperature of the system), it is a mathematical fact
that
lim
N→∞,E
N
= 3
2
kBT
λE
({
X ∈ ΓE : vi,x ∈ [a, b]
})
=
∫ b
a
exp
(
− 1kBT
mv2
2
)
(
2pikBT
m
)3/2 dv . (9)
From this, one can conclude that for any ǫ > 0:
λE
({
X :
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
χ{vi,x∈[a,b]}(X)−
∫ b
a
exp
(
− 1kBT
mv2
2
)
(
2pikBT
m
)3/2 dv
∣∣∣ > ǫ
})
→ 0, N →∞. (10)
The derivation of this result is a more or less elementary exercise in measure theory.
The more profound question, however, is what this result actually means.
The function ρ(v) ∝ exp
(
− 1kBT
mv2
2
)
is called the Maxwell distribution. It is a proba-
bility measure, describing a distribution of particle velocities. Note that there is actually
nothing random about the velocities of particles in a gas. The velocity (as well as the
position) of every single particle is comprised in the microstate X whose evolution is
described by a deterministic equation of motion. There are possible X for which the
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actual distribution of velocities in the gas differs significantly from that described by
the Maxwell distribution. For instance, there are microstates X for which all particles
move with one and the same velocity. Or microstates X for which a few very fast par-
ticles account for almost the entire kinetic energy, while all the others are nearly at
rest. But these states are (obviously) very special ones. The crucial and remarkable
fact expressed by equation (10) is that, for large N, the overwhelming majority of pos-
sible microstates is such that the distribution of velocities in the gas is (approximately)
Maxwellian. The “overwhelming majority of microstates” is thereby defined in terms of
the stationary measure λE. In this sense, the Maxwell distribution constitutes a predic-
tion of the microscopic particle theory as a statistical regularity manifested for typical
(initial) configurations.
Ludwig Boltzmann expressed this reasoning as follows:
The ensuing, most likely state [...] which we call that of the Maxwellian
velocity distribution, since it was Maxwell who first found the mathematical
expression in a special case, is not an outstanding singular state, opposite to
which there are infinitely many more non-Maxwellian velocity-distributions,
but it is, to the contrary, distinguished by the fact that by far the largest num-
ber of possible states have the characteristic properties of the Maxwellian dis-
tribution, and that compared to this number the amount of possible velocity-
distributions that deviate significantly from Maxwell’s is vanishingly small.
(Boltzmann, 1896, p. 252, translation by the authors)
Note that the role of the microcanonical measure in this argument is only to give precise
meaning to “by far the largest number of all possible states”, that is, to provide a
well-defined notion of typicality. The Maxwell distribution, in contrast, refers to actual
statistical patterns, that is, relative frequencies in typical particle ensembles. Hence, it
is important to appreciate the fact that while two measures appear in the mathematical
equation (10), their status is very different (c.f. Goldstein (2012)). To make this point
clear, we add the following observations:
1. Since the box in our example exists only once – even more so if it is supposed to be
a model for the universe –, probabilistic statements about its (initial) microstate
have no empirical meaning. The Maxwellian ρ refers to an actual distribution
of velocities that exists in the box. The microcanonical measure does not refer
to an ensemble of boxes, but pertains to a way of reasoning about the box and
the physical laws describing it, allowing us to establish that the observed velocity
distribution is typical.
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2. Also, the microcanonical measure is not supposed to quantify our knowledge and
/ or ignorance about the microstate of the gas. While it is correct to say, in
some sense, that randomness in a deterministic theory is only due to our ignorance
regarding initial conditions, it is important to note the very limited degree to
which knowledge, information, credences or other subjective notions play a role in
the analysis. It is an objective fact that for the great majority of microstates, the
distribution of velocities in an ideal gas is (approximately) Maxwellian and it is
this objective fact that we take to be explanatory.
3. With respect to a typicality measure, only sets of very large (≈ 1) or very small
(≈ 0) measure are meaningful. Therefore, a probability measure has actually too
much mathematical structure and the meaning of “typical” would not change, if
we changed our measure in a more or less continuous fashion.
2.3 The coin toss
An analogous reasoning can be applied to more mundane examples like the before men-
tioned coin toss. It is a statistical regularity found in our universe that the relative
frequency of heads or tails in a long series of fair coin tosses is approximately 1/2. Now
if we agree that a coin toss is guided by the same laws as all other physical processes in
the world, this statistical regularity has to be explained on the basis of the fundamental
microscopic theory (here: classical mechanics). It is not a new kind of law that holds
over and above the microscopic laws.
Let’s denote by Fi the outcome of the i’th coin toss in a long series of N coin tosses.
We say that Fi = 1 if the outcome is heads and Fi = 0 if the outcome is tails. Since
classical mechanics is deterministic, the outcome of every single coin toss is actually
determined, through the fundamental laws of motion, by the initial state of the universe.
Hence, we have: Fi = Fi(X) for X ∈ Γ the initial microstate of the Newtonian universe.
The functions Fi are obviously (very) coarse-graining. We do not care about the exact
configuration of atoms making up the coin, we do not even care about the exact position
or orientation of the coin, we only ask which side is up as the coin lands on the floor.
This defines our macroscopic observables.
There are possible initial configurations conceivable that would give rise to a universe
that looks pretty much like ours but in which the relative frequency of heads is very
different from 1/2. Conceivably, there are possible initial configurations for which every
coin ever to be tossed will land on heads, or for which tails will come out 2 out of 3 times
and so on and so forth. But such initial conditions are very special ones. In contrast,
typical initial conditions of the universe – compatible with there being coins and coin
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tossers in the first place2– are such that the relative frequency of heads or tails in a long
series of fair coin tosses is approximately 1/2. Formally, the claim is that for any ǫ > 0,
λ
(∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Fi(X) −
1
2
∣∣∣ > ǫ
)
→ 0, N →∞. (11)
This is to say that if N is sufficiently large, the set of initial conditions for which the
relative frequency of heads deviates significantly from 1/2 is extremely small. Such initial
conditions are thus not impossible, but atypical.
The mathematically trained reader will certainly identify (11) as a law of large numbers
statement. The law of large number is what connects probabilities to relative frequencies
in typical ensembles. The distinction between the typicality measure and the probabil-
ity distribution is here, once again, crucial in order to avoid the usual redundancy of
explaining probabilities in terms of probabilities.
We emphasize that, according to this account, probabilities are objective. They apply
to patterns in the world instead of subjective beliefs. It is a matter of fact that, as the
number of coin tosses N becomes very large, almost all sequences of coin toss outcomes
manifest the pattern of an approximately equal frequency of heads and tails. This
matter of fact is independent of what agents believe about the outcomes (although both
are linked: it is of course rational to adapt one’s beliefs to the patterns in the world).
Finally, one may wonder why we have described the outcomes Fi as random variables
on the configuration space of the entire universe. While this may seem a little excessive
at first, it is actually where any consistent analysis leads us if one thinks it through to
the end. To avoid any queries regarding free will, let us assume that the coins are not
tossed by human hand but by a coin-tossing machine. At time t = 0 a large number N
of fair coins is filled into the machine, which is then sealed and shielded from outside
influences. From there on, everything takes its (deterministic) course: the outcome
of each coin toss is completely determined by the initial configuration of the machine.
But the initial configuration of the coin-tossing machine is itself the result of physical
processes (the processes of building and setting up the machine) that are determined
by suitably specified initial conditions. And these initial conditions are the result of
other deterministic processes in an even larger system – and so on and so forth. To
defer the question of typicality further and further to larger and larger systems is just
to pass the buck. But the buck stops with the universe. The universe is what it is.
2Actually, in a typical Newtonian universe, there are no coins in the first place, because such universes
are in thermal equilibrium. Hence, we would really have to condition our measure on the past
hypothesis, the low-entropy initial macrostate of the universe, see Albert (2003).
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There is nothing before and nothing outside. Hence, the key question – in fact, the
only important question – is whether the statistical patterns we observe are a feature of
typical (Newtonian) universes.
2.4 Deterministic subsystems: the stone throw
As mentioned before, there are many situations in CM that are not like the coin toss
or the molecules in a gas. For example, when we compute the trajectory of a stone
thrown on earth, we can, in general, use a simple deterministic equation without being
embarrassed by our ignorance regarding the exact initial microstate of the stone or its
environment. There are two conditions satisfied here that allow us to do that:
1. The external forces, that is, the influence of the rest of the universe neglected in
the computations is very small compared to the attraction between the stone and
the earth. This is usually the case because other gravitating bodies are either very
far away or have very small mass compared to the earth. Formally, this is to say
that
Vext ≈ 0, (12)
which allows us to treat the system stone / earth for all practical purposes as an
independent Newtonian intertial system.
2. The evolution of the relevant macroscopic variable – here, the center of mass of the
stone – is reasonably robust against variations in the microscopic initial conditions.
In other words, small changes in the microscopic initial conditions have only small
effects on the trajectory of the stone. This is why our ignorance about the exact
position and momentum of every single particle constituting the stone (or the earth,
or the person/apparatus throwing the stone) does not prevent us from making
pretty reliable predictions about the motion of its centre of mass.
Nonetheless, even in this case, our prediction for the trajectory of the stone is strictly
speaking a typicality result. Atypical events in the environment or fluctuations of the
particles constituting the stone could lead to very different outcomes. Hence, to be
precise, we would have to cast our result about the trajectory of the stone in a form that
looks quite similar to the probabilistic statements (10) or (11). For instance, denoting by
x(t) the computed trajectory (depending on the initial position and momentum of the
stone) and by x˜(t) the actual trajectory of the stone (depending on the initial condition
X of the universe), we could write:
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λ
({
X : sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜(t)− x(t)| > ǫ
})
≈ 0. (13)
Still, the stone throw example points to a striking difference between classical and quan-
tum mechanics. In CM, we often encounter situations in which correlations between a
subsystem and its environment become negligible, allowing for a (more or less) deter-
ministic description of the subsystem. In QM, by contrast, the generic situation is much
more similar to the coin toss or the molecule in a gas, where predictions of statistical
patterns are the best we can hope for. Our aim is now to explain why this is so.
3 Probabilities in Bohmian quantum mechanics
Having discussed probabilities in classical physics, we now turn to the quantum case. In
QM, we encounter a new dynamical feature that is totally absent from CM: the specifica-
tion of initial positions and momenta is replaced with the specification of an initial wave
function. The wave function is entangled and is defined on configuration space. Due to
entanglement, wave functions cannot be attributed to the particles separately, as initial
parameters are attributed to them separately in CM. That is to say, there is fundamen-
tally only one wave function for the whole particle configuration of the universe taken
together. It correlates the state of any particle with, in principle, any other particle,
without that correlation having to depend on the distance between the particles.
As announced in the introduction, we consider Bohmian Mechanics (BM) to provide
the most convincing solution to the quantum measurement problem. BM is based on
the following three axioms:
1. A Bohmian system with N particles is completely described by a couple (Q,Ψ),
where Q = (Q1, . . . , QN ) ∈ R
3N represents the spatial configuration of the particles
and Ψ is a complex, square-integrable function on the configuration space R3N
called the universal wave function.
2. The evolution of the wave function Ψ is described by the Schrödinger equation
i~∂tΨt = HΨt, (14)
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system.
3. The evolution of the particle configuration is described by a first order differential
equation in which the wave function Ψ enters to determine a velocity field vΨt
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along which the particles move. More precisely, the particles move according to
the guiding equation
Q˙k = v
Ψ
k,t(Q) :=
~
mk
Im
∇kΨt(Q)
Ψt(Q)
, (15)
wheremk denotes the mass of the k’th particle. Note that, due to the entanglement
of the wave function, the resulting law of motion is non-local.
Given an initial wave function Ψ0 and the initial particle configuration Q0 ∈ R
3N ,
the evolution of the system is completely and uniquely determined for all times. This
determinism is contrary to the popular believe that quantum mechanics is intrinsically
and irreducibly random. However, since we do not know (in fact, as we will see, cannot
know) the exact particle configuration, we have to resort once again to a statistical
analysis in order to extract meaningful predictions. We will now show that, to this end,
we can pursue the same strategy as we did before in CM. In the following, we will largely
rely on the development of this strategy in Dürr and Teufel (2009) and Dürr et al. (2013)
(see Callender (2007) and Maudlin (2007) for a philosophical analysis).
For a statistical analysis of BM, we need a) a sensible typicality measure defined on
configuration space and b) a procedure to get from the fundamental, universal descrip-
tion in terms of the universal wave function to a well-defined description of Bohmian
subsystems. Given the universal wave function, the appropriate notion of typicality for
particle configurations is given in terms of the measure with density |Ψ|2. The crucial
feature of this measure is that it is equivariant, assuring that typical sets remain typical
and atypical sets remain atypical under the Bohmian time-evolution. More precisely, if
ΦΨt,0 is the flow on configuration space induced by the guiding equation (15), then
P
Ψ(A) :=
∫
A
|Ψ0|
2 d3Nq =
∫
ΦΨ
t,0
(A)
|Ψt|
2 d3Nq (16)
holds for any measurable set A ⊆ R3N . Equivariance is thus the natural generalization
of stationarity for a non-autonomous (time-dependent) dynamics. The |Ψ|2-measure can
be proven to be the unique equivariant measure for the Bohmian particles dynamics that
depends only locally on Ψ or its derivatives (see Goldstein and Struyve (2007)). In this
sense, it is even more strongly suggested as the correct typicality measure for BM than
the Lebesgue measure was in CM.
Let us now have a closer look at how BM treats subsystems of the universe. Suppose
that the subsystem consists of n ≪ N particles. We then split the configuration space
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into R3N = R3n × R3(N−n), so that, writing q = (x, y), the x-coordinates describe
the degrees of freedom of the subsystem and the y-coordinates describe the possible
configurations of the rest of the universe. Analogously, we split the actual particle
configuration into Q = (Qsys, Qenv) = (X,Y ), with Qsys = X, the configuration of the
subsystem under investigation and Qenv = Y the configuration of its environment.
Now, in passing from the fundamental, universal theory to a description of the sub-
system, we can just take the universal wave function Ψt(q) = Ψt(x, y) and plug into the
y argument the actual configuration Y (t) of the rest of the universe. The resulting
ψYt (x) := Ψt(x, Y (t)) (17)
is now a function of the x coordinates only. It is called the conditional wave function. In
terms of this conditional wave function, the equation of motion for the subsystem takes
the form
X˙(t) ∝ Im
∇xψ
Y
t (x)
ψYt (x)
∣∣∣∣∣
x=X(t)
(18)
to be compared with (15). However, since the conditional wave function depends ex-
plicitely on Y (t), its time-evolution may be extremely complicated and not follow any
Schrödinger-like equation. Fortunately, in many relavant situations, the subsystem will
dynamically decouple from its environment. We say that the subsystem has an effective
wave function ϕ if the universal wave function takes the form
Ψ(x, y) = ϕ(x)χ(y) + Ψ⊥(x, y), (19)
where χ and Ψ⊥ have disjoint y-support and Y ∈ suppχ, so that in particular Ψ⊥(x, Y ) =
0 for almost all x. (Note that this is much weaker than assuming that Ψ has a product
structure, which is in general not the case.) This means that we can effectively forget
about the empty wave packet ψ⊥(x, y) and describe the subsystem in terms of its own
independent wave function ϕ. If we can furthermore assume that the interaction between
subsystem and environment is negligible for some time, that is
Vext(x, y)ϕ(x)χ(y) ≈ 0, (20)
the effective wave function will satisfy its own, autonomous Schrödinger evolution.3 Such
3From the point of view of the subsystem, this part of the interaction potential coupling x and y degrees
of freedom is the external potential. Condition (20) is thus the same as (12) above.
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a ϕ – normalized to
∫
|ϕ(x)|2dx = 1 – is the Bohmian counterpart of the usual quantum
mechanical wave function. It is these effective wave functions that physicists manipulate
in laboratories and for which Born’s rule is formulated.
For our statistical analysis, we start by considering the conditional measure
P
Ψ({Q = (X,Y ),X ∈ dnx}|Y ) =
|Ψ((x, Y ))|2dnx∫
|Ψ((x, Y ))|2dnx
= |ψY (x)|2dnx. (21)
In the special situations described by (19), the conditional wave function ψY on the
right hand side becomes the effective wave function ϕ. This formula already holds a
very deep inside to which we will return in a while. For practical purposes, though,
conditioning on the configuration Y is much too specific, since we have only very limited
knowledge of Y . However, many different Y will yield one and the same effective wave
functions for the subsystem. Collecting all those Y , and using the fact that by yielding
the same effective wave function they also yield the same conditional measure (21), a
simple identity for conditional probabilities yields
P
Ψ({Q = (X,Y ),X ∈ dnx}|ψY = ϕ) = |ϕ|2dnx. (22)
From this formula, one can now derive law of large numbers estimates of the following
kind: at a given time t, consider an ensemble of M identically prepared subsystems with
effective wave function ϕ. Denote by Xi the actual configuration of the i’th subsystem.
Let A ⊆ R3n consider the corresponding indicator function χ{Xi∈A}, which is 1, if the
configuration Xi is in A and 0 otherwise. Then it holds for any ǫ > 0 that
P
Ψ
t =
({
Q :
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
χ{Xi∈A}(Q)−
∫
A
|ϕ(x)|2
∣∣∣ < ǫ
})
→ 0, N →∞. (23)
This is to say that for typical configurations of the universe, the particles in an ensemble
of subsystems with effective wave function ϕ are distributed according to |ϕ|2. Thus,
Born’s rule holds in typical Bohmian universes, that is, in quantum equilibrium.
Once again we emphasize that the |Ψ|2-measure given in terms of the universal wave
function is only used to define typicality. It is not supposed to describe an actual
distribution of configurations, that is, an ensemble of universes, because the universe
exists only once. By contrast, the |ϕ|2-measure on the right hand side, defined in terms
of the effective wave function, does refer to actual particle distributions in a typical
ensemble of identically prepared subsystems. Born’s rule is thus predicted and explained
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by BM as a statistical regularity of typical Bohmian universes.
Comparing equation (22) to (10) (and recalling the reasoning that lead to the respec-
tive equations) we recognize the analogy between the derivation of Maxwell’s distribution
in CM and Born’s rule in Bohmian QM. In essence, it is Boltzmann’s statistical mechan-
ics applied to two different theories. The status of probabilities and the role of typicality
is the same in both cases, although the dynamical laws are strikingly different. On the
one hand, this illustrates the deepness and universality of Boltzmann’s insights. On
the other hand, it shows that there is no need to look for a fundamentally new kind
of randomness in the quantum realm. If the microscopic laws and the ontology of the
theory are clear, probabilities in QM are no more mysterious than they are in CM.
4 Conclusion
So far, we have highlighted the similarities between the statistical analysis of CM and
Bohmian QM, showing that probabilities have the same status in both theories. But
what then is the difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics? Why
is it that the quantum realm appears to us so much more random and unpredictable?
The answer to this question is in part trivial. QM is usually employed to make predic-
tions about microscopic systems, while CM is most often employed to make predictions
about macroscopic systems and coarse-grained observables. The latter are bound to
be more robust against our ignorance regarding microscopic initial conditions. Further-
more, our ability to describe a particular subsystem and the level of detail that we can
thereby achieve depends heavily on the strength of correlations between the investigated
subsystem and the rest of the universe. Newtonian mechanics is a non-local theory,
though only in a rather mild sense. Forces fall off quickly with increasing distance (and
gravity is very weak to begin with) so that parts of the universe can often be described
as autonomous Newtonian systems for all practical purposes.
In quantum mechanics, by contrast, non-locality is much more prevalent. This is
clearly brought out by BM, where the configuration of particles is guided by a common
wave function so that the velocity of any particle depends, in general, on the position
of all the other particles. In any case, due to entanglement, QM allows for correlations
that do not depend on the distance between the correlated systems (the best known
example being the spin singlett state, leading to the famous anti-coincidences in the
EPRB experiment). This makes it much more difficult to consider any proper part of a
Bohmian universe as “isolated”, while ignoring the influence of the rest of the universe.
As a matter of fact, it is often possible to provide an autonomous Bohmian description of
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a Bohmian subsystem in terms of an effective wave function. This autonomy, however,
can be somehow deceiving, because the effective wave function still depends implicitly
on the configuration of the environment (e.g. on the procedure used to prepare that
state in an experimental situation).
More precisely (and more profoundly), our possible knowledge about the particle con-
figuration in a Bohmian subsystem is restricted by the theorem of absolute uncertainty,
which has no analog in classical physics (see Dürr et al. (2013), chapter 2). Absolute
uncertainty is a direct consequence of the conditional probability formula (21): all our
records about the particle positions – brain states, computer prints, pointer position,
etc. – are included in the configuration Y of the rest of the universe. Hence, all possible
correlations between these records and the configuration of the subsystem are already
taken into account in equations (21) and (22) that yield Born’s rule for the distribution
of particle positions.
This connection between our epistemic state and the effective wave function of the
subsystem then works in two ways. One the one hand, it means that given a Bohmian
subsystem with effective wave function ϕ, our information about the particle configura-
tion cannot be more precise than what is given by the |ϕ|2-distribution. On the other
hand, it means that if we perform additional measurements to determine the particle
positions with greater accuracy, the system’s effective wave function becomes more and
more peaked. Hence, the gradients in the velocity formula (15) induce higher and higher
possible velocities, depending on the precise initial configuration of the particles. Less
uncertainty about the initial particle positions thus implies more uncertainty about the
(asymptotic) velocities – this is the source of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Even
small deviations in the initial configuration will thus lead to large deviations of the result-
ing Bohmian trajectories.4 In other words, the manifestly non-local nature of quantum
mechanics is such that a system becomes immediately more chaotic as we try to minimize
our ignorance regarding microscopic initial conditions. As a consequence, we have to
resort to probabilistic reasoning much earlier than is often the case in classical physics.
For a quantum system, Born’s rule provides – provably – as good a description as we
can get in a universe in quantum equilibrium.
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